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The Traynor Proposals-
Some Considerations
By E. Barrett Prettyman :.
WITH a sincere tribute to its frank statementand its exhaustive research into fac s a dfigures, I approach consideration of the article
by Professor Traynor. Any interested reader must
be vividly impressed by these qualities so clearly ap-
parent. It is a refreshing relief to find that the problem
is now to be tackled, and in a manner which is calm,
thorough and obviously earnest. The article by its
tone and its scientific approach invites discussion and
criticism. The scholarship and statesmanship readily
apparent throughout preclude the possibility of any
pride in its authorship being offended by criticism
sincerely made. We may therefore approach the dis-
cussion as a joint venture by the authors, officially
concerned, and ourselves, professionally concerned.
In other words, I take it that since Professor Traynor
and Mr. Surrey have been friendly and at the same
time frank, we can be frank and at the same time
friendly.
Beyond doubt we all thoroughly agree with much
of the article. It is true that there is at present an
alarmingly dangerous delay in the final collection of
many taxes due, that the eventual settlement of so
many cases on the Board of Tax Appeals docket
indicates that they did not require judicial determina-
tion, that it is difficult for the Board to function effec-
tively under present circumstances, and that the
chronic delay entails substantial losses of revenue.
It is also true that multiple reconsiderations in the
Bureau make for confusion, and that there is need
for an objective analysis of controversies in the early
administrative stages.
The proposal involves three principal points of in-
terest-(1) that a new procedure be devised whereby
a taxpayer before the Board of Tax Appeals would
be limited to the grounds, documents and facts out-
lined in his protest to the Commissioner, and the
Commissioner would be limited to the issues and facts
contained in his findings of fact; (2) that a bond be
required for an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals;
and (3) that appellate jurisdiction be concentrated in
a single Court of Tax Appeals.
Background of Suggested Revision
in Board's Functions
It is well that we explore for a moment the causes
of the situation which gives rise to the suggested
* Address delivered before the Eighth Tax Clinic sponsored by the
Committee on Federal Taxation of the American Bar Association,
Washington, D. C., March 25, 1939. An article based upon this
address is appearing concurrently in the June issue of the George-
town Law Journal.
** Attorney at Law, Washington, D. C.; formerly General Counsel
for the Bureau of Internal Revenue and subsequently Corporation
Counsel for the District of Columbia.
revision of the functions and proceedings of the Board,
and submit our own suggestion for remedy before
referring to some demerits which appear to the sug-
gestion in the article.
We are not here concerned with the exercise of a
regulatory power wherein the regulatory authority
seeks to impose its own policy and will upon those
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to be regulated. We are concerned with the collection
of a tax, one of the eternal difficulties of government,
and particularly a tax which involves countless dis-
putes, big and little, simple and complex, of both
law and fact.
We posit two premises. One, that the income and
estate taxes involve an infinite multitude of legitimately
disputable questions of fact and of law. Two, that
administration solution of these disputes is far pre-
ferable to judicial solution.
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When we attempt to devise an administrative gov-
ernmental procedure we are face to face with a very
practical fact, which is that so long as democratic
government continues the people will not accept what
they consider unreasonable or unfair methods or rules.
An individual simply will not accept an administra-
tive ruling which he considers unfair or arbitrary.
He will litigate every time. People in the mass come
to a conclusion slowly, but whenever they at last
conclude that a particular governmental activity is
arbitrary or unfair, they have no mercy and little dis-
crimination. The whole business must be repealed,
destroyed. We simply cannot ignore so deep-seated
a conviction on the part of American citizens, and we
are simply foolish if we do not use and capitalize upon
the natural inherent attitude of these same citizens
toward their government and its agents. An American
likes to be proud of his government and if encouraged
or even permitted to do so, will co6perate with its
agents, short only of submission to what he may deem
to be the unfair exercise of power. For some reason
or other, government seems never to learn this lesson:
-"Never ?" Well, hardly ever.
Policy of Board v. Procedure
An administrative program for the solution of dis-
putable problems must have three elements-personnel,
policy and procedure.
There is nowhere a question as to the competency
or courage of the personnel engaged in federal tax
collection. There is not in this country in any private
agency or group of agencies a personnel comparable
in experience, character and knowledge with the per-
sonnel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Nor, I
may add, is there in any law office in this country a
trial staff comparable to the staff of the Chief Counsel's
office in the trial of tax cases.
Professor Traynor thinks that the present difficulty
lies in the procedure pursued. My thesis is that it lies
in policy, or perhaps more accurately stated in an
attitude of approach, rather than in the procedure.
he Board of Tax Appeals is too valuable an adji
the governmental tax procedure to be lightly condemi
cause its docket is clogged. It was intended by its cre-
be a forum in which cases necessarily litigated could b
ditiously and expertly decided. It represents to the Ar
taxpayer an assurance of fair and impartial adjudicatio
troubles before he is compelled to meet with cash thed
of the Government for additional taxes."
Between the summer of 1933 and the spring of 1934,
the pending cases before the Board of Tax Appeals
were reduced from almost 19,000 to less than 9,000.
As everybody knows, that task was accomplished by
a very simple method in two parts-first, a selected
staff was assembled by the Commissioner and advised
that they were to be personally responsible to him for
their activities, a similar staff with a similar instruc-
tion was assembled by the General Counsel, and the
members of the two groups were paired off, one and
one together. Second, these men were sent into the
field with the accumulated cases and told to find the
right answers, assured that they would receive unstinted
official support regardless of the dollar return from
their efforts so long as the answers they reached were,
so far as humanly possible, the correct answers to the
problems presented. Those men had little difficulty
with that task. Once their judgment was released from
the necessity of showing a tax in every case, from the
embarrassment of having to work backward from ,the
dollar column to the actual question stated, they knew
pretty much what the right answers were or what the
probable results of litigation would be. And the tax-
payers' counsel knew, also. The result was not only
a dissipation of the jam, but it is absolutely certain
that more money was put into the Treasury in actual
cash dollars than would have been collected if all
those cases had been litigated. And that policy could
be made a permanent policy of the Treasury. I have
said before and I say again that if the consensus of
public opinion were to be "If the Bureau boys say this
is right, it is right," the problem of collecting the tax
would vanish into thin air. And I am positively cer-
tain that such a state of mind could be created with
very little effort on the part of the Treasury.
If the Treasury were to adopt the policy of finding
the right answer to the problem in every case, and
were to offer to its men in the field and in the con-
ference room full support if the right answers are
given to the best of the knowledge and the judgment
of the officials concerned, the matter of procedure will
solve itself. But so long as the men actually handling
the cases are required, or think they are required, to
show a tax in every case, and to show as much tax as
the taxpayer will stand-and then just a wee bit more
-you will never devise an administrative procedure
which will satisfactorily collect the tax in this country
so long as democratic processes continue. The difficulty
is not in the procedure. The difficulty is in the policy
under which the government men in the
field are working, or think they are working.
This is not said in a spirit of criticism.
unct to Many earnest and intelligent public officials
ned be- hold to the view that the duty of taxing
officers is to claim for the Government the
ators to maximum possible upon the theory that the
e expe- taxpayer will take care of himself. Our
nerican suggestion is that such a policy does not
make for administrative disposition of dis-
n of his puted cases. It makes for litigation. Our
emands suggestion is that the Treasury drill its
officers in a policy of rendering the right
answer to the question presented. The pro-
cedure and the revenue will amply take
care of themselves under such a policy.
It seems to me that the Traynor article stresses out
of all proportion the Commissioner's lack of informa-
tion in his consideration of disputed tax matters. The
major premise of the article seems to be that tax-
payers as a class withhold vital information from the
Treasury in these disputes. In candor we must sub-
mit that the article is wrong in this assumption.
(Continued on page 438)
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(Continued from page 398)
In the vast majority of cases the examining agent is
given everything he needs or asks for. The fact is
that the Commissioner makes his initial proposal of
a deficiency upon his own discovery of a fact or a
difference of opinion between himself and the taxpayer
as to the proper rule to be applied to the agreed facts.
There is no justification under the statutes for the
Commissioner to make a determination of a deficiency
in tax unless he knows what it is he is doing. The
statute attaches a presumption of validity to his de-
termination. A declaration of deficiency upon a mere
vague suspicion that if he, the Commissioner, knew
more about the situation, he might possibly find some
tax due, is not contemplated by the statute. As a
matter of fact, a general notion that such is the
frequent practice of the Bureau is one of the chief
reasons for the widespread attitude of resistance to
deficiency notices on the part of taxpayers.
The article says that
"The complete innocuousness at the present time of the
so-called 'protest' to the thirty-day letter and the vague incon-
clusiveness of many of the ninety-day deficiency letters are
directly traceable to the absences of such counterbalances."
We agree with the characterizations, but not to the
designation of cause. It is true that in all too many
cases the officials in Washington are without full in-
formation in cases, but the revenue agents and deputy
collectors in the field have the facts in field cases and
the auditors and conferees in office audits either have
the full facts or have the power to get them. Both the
Commissioner and the Collectors have the powers
of examination and of subpoena. The paucity of
factual data in office reports is not the fault of the
taxpayers. It is the fault of the Bureau. The in-
vestigatory forces are led to put too much emphasis
on the amount of the tax proposed, and too little on
the revelation of the facts involved. The temptation
to show a big tax and to skip the facts which show
it is not due, has been made too great. The combined
wrath and antagonism thus aroused in the taxpayer
does not make for sympathetic co6peration on his part
to the speedy and correct solution of the problems
raised by the agent. The Bureau ought to insist upon
full revelation of all the facts by its field agents and
its conferees. Those men are both able and willing
to comply with such a policy if the judgment rendered
upon them by their superiors were less influenced by
the dollar amount of proposed additional taxes. Of
course, such a policy could conceivably be carried too
far, but the proper balance is readily available in the
insistence upon "Get the right answer" and "State all
the facts," with the resultant esprit de corps created
by public acclamation for efficiency and fairness. It
is a fact that the public hates both a sissy and a bully,
and loves a strong, stern person who is gentle; and all
government work thrives on public approval.
I venture the assertion that it is rare indeed for a
trial attorney for the Bureau who has in his file a
trial brief properly prepared, to be surprised by any
new facts presented by his opponent at the counsel
table, and it is a still rarer occasion when a member
of that shrewd, skillful and schooled staff is thrown
off balance by any such surprise.
Of course, lawyers in private practice are prone to
blame a lost case on a lack of facts, and government
lawyers are human, too. But nobody should be alarmed
at this universal frailty.
Withholding of Facts
In the next place, the Traynor article misconceives
the reason why taxpayers withhold facts from the
Bureau, when they do so withhold them. If the tax-
payer has a fact which he knows will conclude the
controversy in his favor, he does not withhold it if he
thinks he will get a fair decision when he reveals it.
Taxpayers do not like to litigate matters merely to be
litigating. Taxpayers do not like tax lawyers any
more than, if as much as, the Treasury does. The
only reason why a taxpayer withholds a favorable
fact is that he does not believe that the official to whom
the fact is revealed will render a fair and true deci-
sion upon the facts established, but will on the con-
trary bend every effort to the collection of additional
tax regardless of the revelation of facts. The attitude
of "What's the use ?" is the reason for withholding
facts favorable to the taxpayer.
If the withheld fact be unfavorable to the taxpayer,
the government is not harmed. And moreover, such
a fact will probably not be revealed by the taxpayer
any more readily in the course of litigation than in the
administrative process in the first place.
If the Bureau's problem is in the failure of tax-
payers to reveal facts, then let it relieve taxpayers'
minds of the idea that Bureau agents will not render
the right answer to the best of their knowledge re-
gardless of the tax result, and this problem will
promptly disappear.
Shifting of Responsibility
It is true, as Professor Traynor says, that the many
avenues open for the shifting of responsibility is a
factor in the reluctance of officials to assume it, but
a much more potent factor is the compulsion which
they feel, real or imaginary, that it is to their best
interest not to take too much responsibility if the
situation seems to require a yielding toward the tax-
payers' views--or, perhaps we had better express it,
a leaning away from an additional tax possibly but
not probably due.
Of course, there are two classes of cases to which
the foregoing general remarks do not apply. They
are those of the intentional outlaws, a small minority,
and those involving questions which should in any
event be submitted to the judicial branch of govern-
ment for decision. The former should be disposed
of with annihilating brevity. The latter should be
handled with deliberate care. Neither class presents
any great problem so long as they are not magnified
out of all proportion to their correct place in the
general picture.
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Finding of Facts
We find ground for criticism of Professor Traynor's
proposal as to the Commissioner's findings of fact.
The plan requires the taxpayer's protest (made under
oath) to contain a statement of all the facts, evidentiary
and ultimate, a list of the documents, etc., upon which
he relies and where located, and a list of the persons
familiar with the material facts. Upon the basis of
the protest the Commissioner will make findings of
fact. While in theory the findings would be the find-
ings of the Commissioner, in practice they would be
the findings of a local examining agent, a subordinate
employee, who might or might not be an attorney,
and might be utterly incompetent to make appropriate
findings of fact, especially in difficult and close cases.
Such findings when made would be adopted by the
Board as final, subject only to the taxpayer's right
"to prove before the Board that the conclusions and
findings of fact of the Commissioner were erroneous."
This procedure would deprive the taxpayer of the
right of cross-examination. The examining agent
would be permitted to include additional facts in his
findings. Yet the taxpayer would have no right to
test the accuracy of such facts by cross-examination
and is relegated to the right, before the Board, of
negating the facts found by the examining agent.
With right to appeal to a local Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals denied, a Board practice might readily
grow up under which the Commissioner's findings of
fact would be upheld as conclusive in almost every
instance.
By limiting the Commissioner and the taxpayer to
the issues raised and the facts included in the protest
(subject to certain exceptions in the case of after-
decided cases), the taxpayer would be forced to make
his case in every factual detail in a written protest
under oath. In large actions, such as valuations and
corporate reorganizations, this would result in an
enormous written record, which, if the examining
agent makes adverse findings, must be entirely re-
made before the Board of Tax Appeals. This would
definitely delay and clog the disposition of such cases.
If the Commissioner is under a handicap on account
of failure to know the material facts on consideration
of the protest or in the preparation of the case for
trial, he can readily be given a right of examination
before trial.
Some blame is visited upon the Board of Tax Ap-
peals in the difficulties described by the article. The
Board can readily consider and dispose of between
1,500 and 2,000 cases a year by hearing and decision.
It ought not be called upon to consider more. There
is no sound reason why more than that number of
cases should be litigated in any one year. That four
or five times that number of cases go to its docket and
then three-fourths of those cases are settled before
trial shows that somebody has been unnecessarily
stubborn about something in the earlier stages of
negotiation. 'The pending question is "Who ?" Tax-
payers may cry out "The Treasury" and the Treas-
ury may cry out "The Taxpayer." But I suspect that
the true answer is a little of both, and that if some-
body not afflicted with a crying-out complex could
calmly diagnose the cause of the pain, a cure can be
effected. The death of the patient is 'not indicated by
present symptoms.
Reasons for Creation of the BTA
The Board of Tax Appeals is too valuable an adjunct
to the governmental tax procedure to be lightly
condemned because its docket is clogged. It was in-
tended by its creators to be a forum in which cases
necessarily litigated could be expeditiously and expertly
decided. It was not intended as a public resort for
parties who have been, either one or the other or
both, unnecessarily stubborn in negotiating a difficulty
through administrative processes. It was not intended
as a haven for fugitives from tax obligations. It was
not intended as the buckeye for government officials
harassed with difficult problems. That it has been
used for all these purposes is no reason for its destruc-
tion. It represents to the American taxpayer an as-
surance of fair and impartial adjudication of his
troubles before he is compelled to meet with cash the
demands of the government for additional taxes.
Whether taxpayers need such an assurance is beside
the point. They have thought they do and caused
Congress to create the Board for that purpose. None
of the present difficulties would be solved by its aboli-
tion. On the contrary, the difficulties would be thereby
greatly aggravated by the suspicion and hostility
created in the minds of taxpayers by the insistence
of the Treasury upon compliance in cash with its own
determination without review. It is not as though
taxpayers had never experienced the Board. They
have had it for some fifteen years. The reasons why
the Board is misused are partly because its docket is
clogged and partly because one party or the other has
failed to be frank and fair until the last moment. If
we can cure these two troubles, the Board can resume
the function for which it was created, a valuable func-
tion in orderly governmental tax processes. And I
hark back to my first thesis as the real cure.
There is much to be said for and against decentrali-
zation, both of the Bureau and of the Board. The
short of it is that, like almost everything else, well
designed it is good; improperly designed it is bad.
Shall Bond Be Required for Appeals?
We vehemently disagree with the suggestion that
bond be required for appeals to the Board of Tax
Appeals, basing our disagreement principally upon the
injustice such a provision would entail. If the litigated
cases be reduced to a proper number, the mere fact
that a case is litigable under such a program would
deny that an unnecessary burden impede the right of
the taxpayer to litigate. Bonds in large amounts are
almost prohibitive in price, and bonds in small amounts
on small taxpayers are a gratuitous obstacle to the
adjudication of his rights.
The recent Tex-Penn case'x comes to mind as an
example. Originally the Commissioner asserted a
deficiency of some $68,000,000, which fell entirely
upon two individual citizens since the corporation
involved had long since been dissolved. A bond was
1 Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co. et al., 300 U. S. 481, 57 S. Ct,
569, 37-1 USTC 1 9194.
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out of the question and payment equally impossible.
Any judicial review would have been thus definitely
foreclosed. Yet in that case the Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court held that the tax-
payers owed nothing additional. Had such a case
arisen under the suggested rule, the gravest injustice
would have resulted.
Furthermore, the requirement would tend to en-
courage unduly high assessments. In cases which
involve a very large deficiency, the very existence of
the requirement would tend to encourage an over-
eager tax collector to raise the assessment by the
stroke of a pen and assert a figure which, on account
of the considerations indicated above, would preclude
any recourse except a hat in hand on the ground of
insolvency.
Bonds on appeals to the Circuit Courts from the
Board are a different matter. A day in court has
already been had. Moreover, appeal bonds to the
Circuit Court are merely for supersedeas, whereas the
proposed bond to the Board would be jurisdictional.
Under the statutes as at present drawn, the Com-
missioner has power to force a taxpayer to assume
the burden of disproving a liability by the simple act
of signing his name to a deficiency notice. This power
must be limited by ready and inexpensive judicial
review, in order to safeguard the rights of a citizen
and insure approximate justice.
Withdrawal of Jurisdiction from District
and Appeals Courts
We come now to the proposed withdrawal of juris-
diction from Federal District Courts and Circuit Courts
of Appeal; the division of the Board into five regional
divisions and the creation of a single court of Tax
Appeals. This is a fundamental and far-reaching
change in our traditional judicial procedure. It
should be scrutinized with utmost care. The follow-
ing considerations appear:
(1) By depriving the District and Circuit Courts
of Appeal of all jurisdiction, leaving open only an
administrative quasi-judicial tribunal closely identified
with the Treasury, the confidence of the citizen in the
justice of an adverse decision is definitely undermined.
(2) The elimination of all right of trial by jury
deprives the citizen of a traditional local right, the
existence of which, whether used or not used, is es-
sential to preserve confidence in government. Whilejury trials are rare, the existence of the right is funda-
mental in such a vital field as taxation, and is some-
times availed of in the accomplishment of justice.
(3) The plan would completely eliminate the healthy
approach and broad experience of the federal courts
in the field of substantive law, upon which the large
majority of tax cases turn; the income tax is not "a
distinct branch of the law" but must be applied in
accordance with the broad principles of substantive
law upon which it rests. The handling of tax ques-
tions exclusively by tax tribunals would definitely
tend toward technicality of decision and ultimately
confine all tax practice to so-called tax experts and
"a specialized tax bar," thus depriving a citizen of
the benefit of representation by attorneys trained and
experienced in the fundamental principles of juris-
prudence. The segregation of tax law from the gen-
eral body of our substantive law would be intolerable.
(4) The procedure might be held not to constitute
due process, since it deprives the citizen of right of
recourse to a constitutional court. The limited but
discretionary review by certiorari to the Supreme
Court does not cure the constitutional defect. Even
though the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia should be made the one appellate court,
the same considerations would exist which underlie
the constitutional requirement of a judicial remedy
in a constitutional court, namely, all citizens would
be forced to journey to a distant point, thus depriving
them of the right of trial and appeal in the local com-
munity before judges locally known, and greatly in-
creasing the burden and expense of litigation.
(5) The existence of such a single court would tend
strongly to eliminate final review by the Supreme
Court on matters of vital and national importance,
thus depriving the Treasury and the citizen of the
broad vision and realistic quality of a decision of that
Court, particularly in a field where the modern tend-
ency is to cloak economic and political reform in the
guise of taxation.
Conflicting Opinions as a Deterrent to Arbitrary
or Hasty Judgment
The main abuse toward the correction of which the
plan is directed is the existing diversity of decision
among different Circuit Courts of Appeal and the in-
ability under present certiorari practice of obtaining
speedy and final determinations by the Supreme Court.
We do not agree that conflicts in decision in the
Circuit Court are necessarily an evil. If the truly
right answer is the ultimate goal of all concerned, a
second consideration by a second tribunal often cor-
rects an initial error. And moreover, the presence of
the possibility of conflicting opinion by equal tribunals
is a deterrent to arbitrary or hasty judgment on the
part of everyone. Of course, too great opportunity
for differing decisions is a torment devoutly to be
avoided, but the eleven circuit courts and the Court
of Claims seem not to involve too great difficulty in
this respect. Moreover, the abuses are not really as
great as the proponents of the plan assert. They
could be largely corrected by improved supervision
over pending cases in the various circuit courts
through the Department of Justice, acting through
one experienced attorney charged with this function.
While the Solicitor General cannot control petitions
for certiorari filed by defeated taxpayers, he can con-
trol petitions filed by the Government.
If the difficulty incident to the existence of ten cir-
cuits is real, the problem could be much reduced by
combining the appellate districts of two Circuit Courts
of Appeals and designating one of the two Circuit Courts
to hear all appeals in tax cases arising within the com-
bined geographical division, thus reducing the reviewing
circuit courts to five instead of ten as at present.
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Conclusion
An admirable suggestion of the article is that both
Commissioner and taxpayer be forced to acquiesce in
a decision of the new Court of Appeals if certiorari
be denied. We all have in mind the classic but
apochryphal tale of the official who asserted the Com-
missioner's non-acquiescence in a decision of the
Supreme Court.
In concluding, let me say as I said in the beginning,
that if we have been more direct or more frank than
the occasion permits, it is because we rejoice in the
directness and frankness of the approach to this problem
by Professor Traynor and Mr. Surrey, who by their
attitude have led us to believe that the Treasury wishes
frank discussion of its proposals to the end that a
remedy be found for a problem vitally affecting us all.
The Traynor Plan -What It Is
(Continued from page 396)
This, in brief, is the "Traynor Plan." Its sole pur-
pose is to provide a procedure that will effectively and
expeditiously determine controversies between the
taxpayer and the Commissioner, and at the same time
will operate with fairness to each party. The word
"plan" may be misleading, for it connotes an inflexible
program, whereas the proposal is subject to whatever
change is necessary to accomplish this purpose. The
proposal was formulated only after critical and objec-
tive appraisal of the present procedure. Criticism of
the proposal should be made on the same objective
plane, for without such objectivity it will be impossible
to achieve a procedure that is equitable to Commis-
sioner and taxpayer alike. It is to be hoped that the
tax bar, possessing as it does a special and intimate
acquaintance with the problems to be solved, will
bring its knowledge and training to bear on these
problems to the end that we may finally obtain an
improved tax administration.
Taxation of Judges' Salaries
(Continued from page 422)
had thus charged them with the common duties of
citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the
cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great
historic experience on which the framers based the safe-
guards of Article III, § 1. To subject them to a general
tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and
that their particular function in government does not gen-
erate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens
the material burden of the government whose Constitution
and laws they are charged with administering.
Miles v. Graham
Miles v. Graham is obliterated in a brief sentence:
"But to the extent that what the Court now says is
inconsistent with what was said in Miles v. Graham,
268 U. S. 501 [1 us'rc IF 138], the latter cannot sur-
vive."
Evans v. Gore
There remains the question of taxability in those
cases where the judge took office before the 1932 Act
or before any taxing statute. Evans v. Gore, supra,
prohibited taxation of the salary in such case. How-
ever, the decision on that question may not require
a repudiation of its principle. The reason is found
in the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939.4 That Act
provides that salaries of Federal judges who took
office before June 6, 1932, are taxable.5 But Sec. 209
of that Act provides that such tax may not be retro-
actively imposed. Consequently, the issue will arise
in connection with the constitutionality of this pro-
vision in the Public Salary Tax Act. However, the
decision on that issue will involve the same principle
as was involved in Evans v. Gore, and the Supreme
Court's comment on that case may have an important
bearing on the Court's future attitude. The opinion
clearly discredits the earlier case. For example:
"However, the meaning which Evans v. Gore imputed
to the history which explains Article III, § 1 was
contrary to the way in which it was read by other
English-speaking courts. The decision met wide and
steadily growing disfavor from legal scholarship and
professional opinion. Evans v. Gore itself was rejected
by most of the courts before whom the matter came
after that decision."
Here discussion of the case stops. But it is reason-
able to conclude that the principle of the case has
been thoroughly devitalized, as the result of which
it is equally reasonable to conclude that the provision
of the Public Salary Tax Act taxing salaries of judges
who took office before June 6, 1932 will also be up-
held. Certainly, if the status of judges appointed after
that date "does not generate an immunity from shar-
ing with their fellow citizens the material burden of
government," there seems to be little reason why
judges appointed before that date cannot be called
upon to share similarly the burden of government.
Dissenting Opinion
Mr. Justice Butler wrote a lengthy and scholarly
dissenting opinion. He traces the constitutional his-
tory of Art. III, § 1. He concludes:
For one convinced that the judgment now given is wrong,
it is impossible to acquiesce or merely to note dissent. And
so this opinion is written to indicate the grounds of opposi-
tion and to evidence regret that another landmark has been
removed.
Excise Tax on Toilet Preparations
In Campana Corp. v. Harrison 6 recently decided by
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
the issue was whether the excise tax on Italian Balm
should be based on the price at which the manufac-
turer (taxpayer), Campana Corporation, sold the
toilet preparation to Campana Sales Company or on
the price at which the latter company sold the product.
The Court held that the sales by the taxpayer to
the selling corporation were at fair market prices, and
at prices for which the articles involved in such sales
were sold in the ordinary course of trade by manu-
facturers or producers thereof. It was therefore held
that the Commissioner erred in basing the tax on the
price for which the selling company sold the product.
Neither corporation held stock of the other and stock-
holders owning stock of each corporation did not hold
the stock in substantially the same proportions.
*Page 12,289, 1939 CCH Index Vol.
' Sec. 3 of the Public Salary Tax Act.
a repudiation of that case although it may require
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